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REPLIES� 
(IN RE E&-A 111/4, Nelson's 
First of all, I would like to thank 
Professor Nelson for h is lucid, thor­
ough review of my work. It is cer­
tainly gratifying, not to mention flat­
tering, to have one's work given the 
careful, thoughtful attention Professor 
Nelson has accorded mine. 
Professor Nelson expresses reser­
vations concerning two of the posi­
tions I have developed. He thinks I 
have underestimated the moral signifi­
cance both of "the kind of thing a 
being is" and of "taking an interest in 
x". I would like to take this oppor­
tu n ity to respond to both of these 
criticisms. 
In my essay entitled "A Critique of 
Personhood" (Ethics 91/4 (1981)), I 
develop a thoroughly meritorian posi­
tion in opposition to what I believe to 
be the logic of prej udice wh ich has 
characterized moral phi losophy. From 
ancient Greece to the present, moral 
philosophers have conferred moral 
status, such as meriting rights, on 
the basis of morally irrelevant, 
descriptive properties, such as being 
Greek, Ch ristian, white, and human. 
In my essay I argue that in order to 
escape prejudice we must stop doing 
moral philosophy in this way and start 
accordi ng moral status on the basis of 
morally relevant, eval uative 
review of articles Sapontzis)�by  
characteristics, such as being vi rtu­
ous. I a rgue that "moral staus is 
properly due, earned, and lost on the 
basis of moral character, that is, on 
the possession of moral virtues, and 
on that alone." 
In that article I acknowledge two 
addenda to that clarion call: (i) if 
being virtuous requires certain 
descriptive properties or capacities, 
such as a sensory system, then one 
may infer from a being's lacking these 
properties or capacities to its not 
meriting rights, and (ii) one may 
without prejudice provisionally accord 
rights . to the you ng who have the 
capacity for developing good moral 
character but have not yet had the 
opportunity to do so. Part of Prof. 
Nelson's reservations concern ing my 
meritorianism seems to amount to a call 
for yet another addendum to that 
position. Th rough developi ng the 
case of a robot baby-sitter and dis­
cussing the oddness of ascribing 
rights to God, Nelson argues that 
whether a being merits rights depends 
on whether it needs rights, i. e., on 
whether it has interests that need to 
be protected 
Although I 
examples, I 
correct and 
addendum to 
or furthered by rights. 
would quibble over his 
think Nelson is basically 
gladly accept th is th ird 
my meritorianism. It in 
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no way compromises my critique of the 
logic of prejudice nor suggests that 
non-human animals who are virtuous 
nonetheless do not merit rights, for 
such animals do have interests which 
need protection and assistance. 
However, Nelson's robot baby-sit­
ter is intended to raise a second, 
more significant criticism: assuming 
that a robot "whose flex ible and 
sophisticated programming allows it to 
respond to the moral goods and evils 
of situations which endanger children" 
is, nevertheless, not virtuous, "it 
may well be that some understanding 
of one's act as being motivated by 
moral concern is both necessary for it 
to be fully virtuous and more charac­
teristic of persons than Sapontzis 
admits. " My immediate reaction to 
Nelson's robot example is that it is 
inconsequential, for we have no way 
of deciding whether that robot would 
or would not be vi rtuous. How such 
machines, if they ever become com­
mon, will be integrated into our mor­
ality is a matter which will be decided 
as we develop, live with, and get to 
know them, and until such machines 
become part of our lived world, 
thought experiments about how we 
should evaluate them are just idle 
speculation lacking moral significance. 
About all I can say at this point is 
that assuming that such a robot 
baby-sitter could not be virtuous 
because it is a machine strikes me as 
yet another expression of the logic of 
prejudice - perhaps in the future 
there will have to be a machine liber­
ation movement! 
More seriously, Nelson's robot does 
raise an important issue concerning 
moral motivation: a fully moral agent 
is one who wants to do what is right. 
If a person did the right thing but 
did not want (from feelings of sympa­
thy or respect) to do it, we assume 
he had ulterior motives, was unawa re 
of the moral significance of his action, 
or just responded reflexively; so, the 
example of a presumably unfeeling 
machine protecting children from dan­
ger does not stri ke us as a fully 
moral agent. I believe that it is this 
belief about fully moral motivation 
wh ich leads us to doubt whether 
insects who see to the needs of thei r 
young but who (as far as we can tell) 
do not grieve if death takes those 
young are really morally motivated, 
rather than just being directed by 
some chemical stimuli and biological 
ci rcuitry. 
These issues are too complex to 
deal with in detail here; let me just 
make the following two comments to 
indicate why these issues do not 
th reaten the meritorian animal rights 
position I have developed. Fi rst, not 
to be a fully moral agent is not to be 
a non-moral agent. An individual who 
regularly, intentionally did the right 
thing even though he was not moti­
vated by wanting to do the right 
thing would still be morally superior 
to an individual who did not even do 
the right thing (see my "Moral Value 
and Reason," The Monist 66/1 (1983), 
for some suggestions about the com­
plexity of moral evaluations of actions 
and agents). Second, until recently 
we have not closely observed nor 
tried to understand the lived world of 
animals; consequently, we have seri­
ously underestimated the complexity 
and range of animal psychology, as 
ethological studies are beginning to 
show. Many more such careful, sym­
pathetic studies a re needed to show 
the full extent of fully moral motiva­
tion among animals. Consequently, 
even if we recognize the need for 
emotional involvement in fully moral 
motivation, it does not follow that this 
will require that virtuous agents be 
closely similar to humans. 
Nel son's other reservation concern­
ing my meritorian position is that it 
would complicate our moral casuistry 
and lead us to condemn some animals 
as vicious. I find no conceptual 
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problem with declaring some animals 
vicious and punishing or attempting to 
rehabilitate them. This is already 
common practice. What is needed to 
make that practice morally acceptable 
is to extend to accused animal crimi­
nals the commitment to impartiality, 
adequate defense cou nsel, rejection of 
cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the other safeguards of the human 
criminal system. In dealing with ani­
mal misbehavior we should keep in 
mind the sorts of things we keep in 
mind when dealing with the misbehav­
ior of people from very different cul­
tures, children, and the retarded. 
That is, generally, we need to evalu­
ate them against the best that can be 
expected of them, given their back­
ground and capacities, rather than 
evaluating them against the standards 
for normal human adults raised in our 
society. Perhaps this is a fou rth 
"kind of being it is" addendum to my 
meritorianism. If so, I gladly acc~pt
it, for it merely adds further, realis­
tic complexity to that position. It 
does not at all point in the direction 
of a difference "which would justify 
ascribing a right to life to persons 
but not to animals" - we do, after all, 
ascribe a right to life to children, 
even though we do not expect them to 
be as morally accomplished as adults. 
Turning to Nelson's second reser­
vation, that I underestimate the moral 
significance of taking an interest in 
something, I should first mention that 
I . have recently publ ished an essay 
devoted to this issue. It is entitled 
"The Moral Significance of Interests" 
and appeared in the Winter, 1982, 
issue of Environmental Ethics. The 
main thesis of that essay is that the 
difference between taking an interest 
and merely having an interest in 
something is of only secondary moral 
importance. 
Here again, Nelson offers three 
reasons' to show that. I have underes­
timated matters: the misfortu ne of 
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death requires that death be the 
frustration of a desire to live; we 
value life itself, not just the quality 
of life; and if merely having an inter­
est provides a sufficient foundation 
for a right, then dogs should have a 
right to vote, since they have an 
interest in who wins the election. I 
do not th ink any of these objections 
points toward a morally serious differ­
ence between having and taking an 
interest in something. 
If the logical oddity of the misfor­
tu ne of death is that "death removes 
the subject of the harm," then refer­
ring to death frustrating a desire to 
live no more meets this problem than 
does referring to death's eliminating 
the· possibility of the individual's 
futu re happi ness. The deceased does 
not experience the frustration of his 
desire to live any more than he expe­
riences the loss of the happiness he 
might have had. Paradoxical as it 
may at first seem, the subject of the 
misfortu ne of death, be that construed 
as the frustration of a desi re or the 
loss of future happiness, is the liv­
ing, who suffer this misfortune when 
they die. 
wou Id not deny that experienc­
ing, especially foreseeing, death as 
the frustration of categorical desires 
may give an emotional dimension to 
death which is lacking in other cases, 
e.g., those of people and other ani­
mals lacki ng categorical desi res and 
those of individuals who die suddenly 
and unexpectedly while unconscious 
and who, consequently, do not expe­
rience thei r deaths at all. However, 
argument is needed to show that only 
when this dimension is present is 
death a misfortu ne and life to be pro­
tected by a right to life. 
Perhaps Nelson's second objection, 
that "it is not merely the quality of 
life that we value, but life itself," is 
supposed to provide that argument. 
Just what "quality" and "life" refer 
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to, to what degree the latter is sepa­
rable from the former, what value the 
latter has if distinguished from the 
former, and what .moral significance 
there is to these distinctions are some 
of the questions that would have to be 
answered before we can know how 
much of an argument there is here. 
For the time being, let me just 
observe that at an intuitive level I 
would agree that we value life itself, 
but, then, so do virtually all animals, 
so that using valuing life itself as a 
criterion for having a right to life 
wou Id not even suggest that such 
right-holders niust be closely similar 
to humans. Vi rtually all an imals 
respond with great fear or anger and 
frantic attempts to escape or resist 
when they recognize their lives are 
being threatened. Some philosophers 
reject "blindly clinging to life" as 
expressing the "valuing" of life itself, 
but I have argued elsewhere that this 
is unjustified ("On Being Morally 
Expendable," Ethics & Animals 111/3 
(1982)). So intuitively it would seem 
that animals do take an interest in life 
itself and should, therefore, benefit 
from whatever moral significance 
attaches to that interest. 
Turning to Nelson's final objection, 
that basing rights on just having 
interests would lead to such absurdi­
ties as giving dogs the right to vote, 
his discussion of this case seems not 
so much a reduction to absu rdity as 
an explanation of why what has tradi­
tionally and unquestioningly been 
labelled absurd is really quite reason­
able and could, through the use of 
proxies, be carried out intelligibly 
and intelligently. Indeed, in Califor­
nia we already have two animal rights 
political action committees; PAWAC and 
ROAR, which are engaged in securing 
political power for animals through 
human proxies. Since we have tradi­
tionally held that political institutions 
shou Id be designed and governed by 
moral values, we should expect that 
bringing animals from the backwaters 
into the mainstream of ou I' morality 
will require revisions in our political 
institutions as well. There is nothing 
in herently absu I'd in th is prospect, 
since the political interests of animals 
can be represented and protected by 
competent human prox ies, just as the 
political interests of children and the 
mentally infirm are currently so rep­
resented and protected. Conse­
quently, I do not believe that I have 
"proven too much" by arguing. that 
one can have a right to something he 
has an interest in but is incapable of 
taking an interest rn. 
Steve F. Sapontzis
 
California State University, Hayward

 
Reply to Sapontzis
 
(I N RE E&A 111/4 and above, Nelson's reply)
review and Sapontzis'  
In my review of Professor Sapont­
zis' work, I suggested that, even if 
we were to grant that animals 
virtuous agents, it would not 
that the moral respect due that 
need be expressed in extending 
were 
follow 
vi rtue 
them 
the rights to life, dignity and C\ ful­
filling life; it would also need to be 
shown that the agents stood in need 
of those rights, that they had inter­
ests which could be protected and 
furthered by those rights. In his 
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reply, Sapontzis accepts this as a 
"third addendum" to his meritorianism, 
but if there is any implication that my 
remarks drove him to this realization, 
he is su rely being over-generous. 
The amount of hard thinking he has 
done on the issue of animal interests 
clearly indicates that he is aware that 
his meritoria n ism a lone is ins ufficient 
to secure the extention of such rights 
to animals; they must not only 
deserve them, they must need them as 
well. 
My SUspICion is that the meritori­
anism (sans addenda) is not only 
insufficient, but unnecessary as well. 
As I indicated in my review, I do not 
see that it is required to undermine 
the "logic of prejudice", and, further, 
I am concerned about the implications 
of regarding fundamental features of 
moral status as granted on the basis 
of good behavior. If Sapontzis· has 
indeed shown that animals can be vir­
tuous, that is a significant result in 
itself; but it seems to me irrelevant to 
questions about what is owing to them 
morally, at least on a level so basic as 
is occupied by the right to life. 
One reason for thinking this stems 
from the view that morality enjoins us 
to show "equal respect to equal inter­
ests," be they of the just or the 
unjust, of the human or the animal. 
But this is an element of a conse­
quentialist ethical framework, with 
wh ich Sapontzis is unsympathetic. 
Another is simply the fear that if 
moral status is a function of our 
behavior, few of us could with much 
confidence lay claim to rights, 
although perhaps I should speak for 
myself alone here. A th i rd is that 
the moral status of the virtues is in 
part derived from morally worthy pro­
jects. Professor Sapontzis has force­
fully argued that the differences 
between humans and animals in such 
respects as 'freedom' and 'rationality' 
do not exclude animals from the range 
of moral virtue. Admittedly, they are 
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not moral actors, but the practice of 
paying moral respect to God arid to 
the natu rally well disposed iridicates 
that being so is not a necessary con­
dition for having rights. And in his 
response he says. "An individual who 
regularly, intentionally did the right 
thing even though he was not moti­
vated by wanting to do the right 
thing would still be morally superior 
to an individual who did not even do 
the right thing" (p. 4). 'Intentionally' 
here is ambiguous. Does it have 
something of the force of 'not by mis­
take' or does it mean 'understood as a 
morally good action'? If the former is 
the proper reading, I just remain 
unconvinced that the actions rebou nd 
at all to the credit of the individual; 
this is really the point of my machine 
example. 
But even if we allow that (some) 
animals are 'intensionally' situated 
appropriately to be virtuous, a prob­
lem remai ns. Vi rtues a re those traits 
which are conducive to the attainment 
of some good goal; they derive moral 
quality from the worthiness of the 
projects to which they contribute. 
So, human parental concern, for 
example, is worth moral approval 
because it contributes to the develop­
ment of discerning moral agents, who 
will strive to make the world a better 
place. The corresponding virtue in 
animals is of less worth, since it does 
not have the same goals. 
A reply to this is that even if 
there is a difference in moral quality 
of human vs. animal virtue, it is not 
sufficient to justify any difference in 
the rights we attribute to them. The 
support for this would come from our 
attribution of moral status to the nat­
urally well-disposed, i.e., those who 
act virtuously but not with any 
thought of strivi ng towa rd a better 
world. But this response overlooks 
that it is not ou r understanding of 
ou r vi rtues that alone gives them 
their quality, but what they in fact 
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contribute to. If animal's virtues 
contribute to projects of less moral 
worth than do human virtues, they 
are less worthy. Hence, Sapontzis' 
argument that virtue is a necessary 
condition for moral respect, and that 
there are no valid "intensional" rea­
sons for denying rights to animals 
may actually leave them in a sort of 
moral limbo. For the "extensional" 
element (so to speak) of virtue--the 
project aimed at--is significantly dif­
ferent. This leaves animals with a 
sort of "second-class" virtue, the 
implications of which are unclear. 
It might still be maintained that the 
very presence of animal virtue calls 
for moral respect tendered in the form 
of a right to life; all that would have 
to be admitted. is that, in conflict 
situations, the life of a human is to 
be preferred to the life of a non-hu­
man, and this is generally allowed 
(some complications might ensue if 
meritorians were as ked to choose 
between a . faithless person and a 
faithful dog, I suppose). This posi­
tion, however, needs an argument. 
Or, it could be held that virtues are 
intrinsically, rather than instrumen­
tally valuable; it would be interesting 
to see this position worked out too. 
In any event I am not convinced that 
one needs to be virtuous--or even 
minimally decent--in order to enjoy 
basic rights. It seems to me that 
vi rtue is very la rgely its own 
reward--it may entitle its possessor to 
the status of moral exemplar, to 
praise, and perhaps to some kind of 
"non-basic" respect, but it is not a 
necessary condition for such basic 
moral respect as is expressed in the 
right to life. 
What is necessa ry- -and I tend to 
think sl,Jfficient, as well--is that death 
somehow be a ha rm to its 'victim.' 
Th is is an extremely complex issue. 
In my review, I indicated that I was 
unsatisfied, on Epicurean grounds, 
with Sapontzis' account of the way in 
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which death is a harm, and suggested 
that a Tooley-style analysis--the harm 
of death residing in its frustrating 
our desire to continue existing as a 
subject of experience--might do us 
better. Understandably, given the 
vagueness of my remarks there, Pro­
fessor Sapontzis can't find any merit 
to this: wouldn't death. remove the 
subject of the frustration in my 
accou nt, even as it removes the sub­
ject of the loss of happiness, on his? 
Let me try to be a bit clearer. I 
want to suggest that there is a moral 
reason for not ki II ing a person that 
may not obtain for non-person ani­
mals. Persons generally cherish life 
and desire to go on living; non-per­
sons--i .e. those who lack a reflexive 
consciousness--do not. Insofar as I 
should respect your desires concern­
ing yourself, I ought not to kill you. 
There a re a number of possible 
responses to this. One is to note 
that many non-humans may well have 
reflexive consciousness--\ believe that 
that is in fact the case, and am ready. 
to accept the moral consequences. 
Another would be to point, as Sapont­
zis does, to the tenacity with which 
animals in general cling to life, 
whether they a re reflexively conscious 
or not. I think a response might be 
made to this position, but I will not 
attempt to do so here. The objection 
that troubles me most is that this 
analysis is too weak to bear the 
weight put on it. For even granting 
a general intense desire to continue to 
live, given my premises, such desires 
seem groundless; there is, after all, 
noth ing for anyone to fear. Ought we 
be as inhibited in contravening 
desi res based on misconceptions as we 
are desi res that have a good founda­
tion? If not, this extremely funda­
mental right would appear to rest on a 
pretty wea k reed. 
Fu rther, on th is view, while kill ing 
may be an offense against the victim 
24 
it still does not harm them, at least in have 
what would seem to be the central there 
sense--it does not make them worse case. 
off. It shows death to be a harm with 
only in the sense that to be wronged effected, then the loss of happiness 
is to be harmed, and this invites the occasioned by death does not wrong 
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been hers, but if B is dead, 
is no question of this being the 
If being wronged is hooked up 
having one's interests adversely 
further response that being deprived the victim. 
of further happiness is to be 
wronged, even if not harmed, as well. This is not the place to attempt to 
But such a response would have force fully work out the intricacies of this 
on Iy if 'the happi ness B wou Id have issue. I remain persuaded, though, 
had' has the same significance when it that a proper analysis of the sense in 
is death that deprives B as when it which death adversely effects the 
is, say, ignorance or illness. I think interests of its victims is a key to 
the difference is that, in the latter determining the character and the 
cases, B may well take or have an scope of the right to life. 
interest in the happiness that might 
James A. Nelson� 
St John's University, Minnesota� 
